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Abstract
This paper focuses on three related matters. It analyses the process of competition in the software
industry, this being important both in itself and for the light it throws on competition within all
industries characterised by low or zero marginal costs and a high rate of technical development. The
software industry, operating under private enterprise, is dependent on copyright, and the issues raised
by intellectual property protection are therefore also considered. Given the need for inter-operability
between different software products, and between these and associated hardware, standardisation is
important within the industry, and the processes by which standards may be established are evaluated.
Consideration is given to the public policy issues that are raised by these three topics.
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Part 1 The Economics of the Industry
Introductory
That the software industry is important need scarcely be argued; its product is integral to a vast and
increasing number of activities which implement the new information technology and which are
already changing, and will continue to change, in ways we can now only dimly foresee, innumerable
aspects of our daily lives.  It is a strikingly novel industry, which displays a pace of technical2
development and of structural mutation that can have few, if any, historical parallels. The techniques
of economic analysis inevitably lag, in their development, on the changing phenomena to which they
are applied, and it would not be surprising for explanations and judgements relating to the software
market to take less than full account of its special characteristics. This first part of my paper offers an
economic analysis of the industry; the second part deals with the policy issues, including that of
intellectual property protection, upon which the existence of the market for software crucially
depends. 
Costs and Competition
In order to understand the working of the software industry, four key features have to be borne in
mind. These features are, the zero marginal cost of using technology, the rapid rate of innovation, the
existence of networks, and the role of standards. It is of course the interaction of these several
circumstances which ultimately have to be considered, but I shall begin by discussing them separately.
Although there may be costs in creating knowledge, they are independent of the extent to which the
knowledge is subsequently used. The costs incurred in developing a software program in particular
are unaffected by the extent to which its use is licensed. In that sense the marginal cost of using the
software, the cost, that is to say, of granting additional licenses, is zero, or at any rate relatively small.3
The production and distribution of diskettes, license documents and manuals will enter into the
marginal costs of the supplier when they are part of the licensing transaction, but need not do so
7McClellan, S. T., The Coming Computer Shakeout, New York et al., John Wiley and Sons, (1984).4
where installation by a computer manufacturer is concerned. User support costs may also be an
element in the supplier's marginal costs, but development costs, which are independent of sales
volume, are overwhelmingly predominant. Of course costs are incurred, indeed heavy costs, in
creating
 additional demand for licenses, but not in fulfilling that demand. 
We have to accept that, where the marginal cost of production is zero, we are posed, or seem to be
posed, with a dilemma. On the one hand, it would appear to be in the interests of consumers that the
available economies of scale are fully exploited, which, in the zero marginal cost case, would suggest
that one producer should cater for the whole market. There would appear to be no room for a second
supplier of a particular software product, far less a third or fourth, if the first supplier can meet any
level of demand, however great, without any difference in the costs incurred. On the other hand, it
is in the interests of consumers that the benefit from the full exploitation of scale economies should
be passed on to them in the form of lower prices, which will not dependably happen unless suppliers
are subject to competitive pressure. It is also in the interests of consumers that there should be, in the
development of software, a variety of approach. We need therefore to consider whether, and how,
these aparently conflicting requirements are reconciled in the market for software; how is it possible,
in other words, to have the advantages which monopoly would here seem to offer, while at the same
time having those which only competition can provide? 
We have first to note the rather obvious circumstance that competing software products need not be
identical, but may offer differing features. Each product can then find its own particular market among
those to whom its particular features appeal, while at the same time, the presence in the general
market of users who find the products reasonably good substitutes ensures price competition between
them. In this way, as in many industries, economies of scale are balanced against the demand for
variety, and competition maintained. 
In the software industry, however, a further powerful factor is at work. Because of the high rate of
underlying technical change, the life of a product is typically very short.  A firm may introduce a new4
product and drive hard, by means of its marketing policies, to achieve the large volume of sales that,
where marginal costs are zero, makes it possible to have low prices and high returns. If successful,
it may then enjoy the lion's share of a particular market. But, although it will have won a battle, it will
not have won the war. Its competitors will already be planning to bring out a better competing
product, and the firm itself, for the sake of its survival, will already be planning its own next move.
As we have already noted, a software product is subject to price competition through the existence
8This idea is developed in ny own DRUID Working Paper no. 96-10, “Competition, Innovation and Increasing5
Returns”, (July 1996).
Some of the practicalities involved in marketing computer software, given in particular the legal context, are6
discussed in detail in Davidson, D. M. and Davidson, J. A., Advanced Legal Systems for Buying and Selling
Computers and Software, New York, John Wiley and Sons (1987).
of alternatives, which, at least for many users, are good, even if not perfect substitutes. But much
more deadly competition is continuously provided by the stream of new and improved products that
take away the ground from under the feet of the established ones. No doubt it is true of most
industries that firms have to run in order to stand still, but rarely do firms have to run so fast as in this
one. We have only to consider how the landscape in computing changes in five years, far less ten, to
appreciate how strongly the “gale of creative destruction” blows though this particular market.  
One finds, in the software industry, competition which as well as being concurrent, is sequential, in
the sense that a product may dominate in a particular market sector at one time, but is always liable
to be replaced, after a short interval, perhaps two years, by another. In manufacturing industry, there
is not the same liability to large and rapid changes in market share, because of the time needed to
install productive capacity.  In the software market, there is no corresponding circumstance, with the5
result that market shares are potentially much more volatile. I say potentially, because producers will
strive to keep what they have gained, appreciating that, in a market of this kind, no position is secure.
The fact that shares may not in fact change violently is not evidence for protected markets;
competitive pressures are exerted by the constant threat of displacement, which established firms can
ward off only through rapid and successful innovation.
There are, of course, limits to the potential volatility; a new product does not sell automatically, but
only with marketing effort, and users will show some reluctance to switch to a new product from
another with which they have become familiar, and in the reputation of whose maker they have come
to trust.  Leap-frogging is also not inevitable; a firm with a lead in a particular market will strive to6
maintain it through continuous upgrading of the product, its experience, acquired capabilities and
market connections helping it to do so. Such advantages are enjoyed by established concerns in
industry generally, and firms compete in endeavouring to secure and maintain them. But there is plenty
of evidence that these advantages are not normally for long decisive; where the scope for innovation
is particularly high, a fresh approach may often prove successful and past success and experience can
trammel as well as support. Only myopia can lead one to believe that a commanding position is
unassailably and continuously secure. We all know that the future will differ from the present, but it
seems to require an effort of imagination fully to appreciate the fact. The established firm, however
mighty it may seem, can be brought down, or at least for a time eclipsed, by complacency, by
9The analysis presented on this paper derives in part from my own academic work on the process of competition.7
This is set out most fully in Richardson, G. B., “Information and Investment: a Study in the Working of the
Competitive Economy”, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 67, p. 228. (1990).
Dvorak, J., Dvorak Predicts: An Insider’s Look at the Computer Industry, Berkeley, California, McGraw - Hill8
(1994). This book deals with the current state of competition within the software industry rather than with the
general principles that are here my concern.
arrogance, or simply by the fact hat market opportunities or technical possibilities change in a way that
favours others with different mind-sets, more relevant experience, more appropriate market
connections, or simply greater luck. This is true generally, but particularly so for an industry in which
positions are so continuously challenged, and in which, as past experience shows, it is so difficult to
know what the future holds in store.
We have to recognise that it is in the public interest, both that a successful product gains a large part
of the market for products of that class, and, at the same time, that this tendency is neither unlimited
or irreversible. Observation confirms that this is what happens; a product may gain the predominant
share of a market, but is unlikely to gain all of it; older products will typically still be in place, new
ones, having gained a foothold, will be striving to tip the general market their way, and other products
will have found a niche market by offering special features.7
The fact that one software product tends, at any one time, to have the lion's share of a particular
market, is the natural outcome of increasing returns to scale and other circumstances which we shall
examine below; it provides, however, no prima facie case for presuming the existence of monopoly
power, and of the detriments, such as protected inefficiency or high prices, commonly associated with
the exercise of monopoly power. In the case of PC operating systems, for example, one product
currently has a very large share of the market, but there are competing products, powerfully backed,
seeking to displace it. And the issue is not so much which products will gain ground if circumstances
remain the same, for we know that circumstances will change, and in such a way that the products
competing tomorrow will not be those competing today. The past experience of the industry makes
this clear; dedicated word processors for example, gave way to the general purpose personal
computer, and character based application gave way to those that were graphically based.  And such8
paradigm shifts will certainly continue to take place in the future; the microprocessors for which the
operating systems are designed are in continuous development, and computers of the future, such as
PC telephones, PC -TV's and multimedia machines of whatever kinds, will be different from those of
the present. 
The firm winning the current race ought therefore to have its mind already on the race to come. That
10
idem.9
According to a study by International Data Corp. at the end of 1995 there were between 8 and 10 million10
individual users of the World Wide Web. By the end of 1996 the number is expected to grow to 30 million. By
the year 2000, that number man go as high as 200 million. Stets, D. “Computer Expert Warns of Internet
Reaching Overload”, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution (14 Jan. 1996).
firm's products are liable to lose ground, not gradually as in some industries, through the gradual
erosion of profit margins as a consequence of rivals' cost savings and incremental  improvements, but
because a new need arises which a rival has the product to meet and it does not. Competition with this
modus operandi is of course not new ; what is new, and features so markedly in the software industry,9
is the rate at which innovation takes place. Perhaps the best example of this is the growth of the
Internet, particularly its World Wide Web, which doubles in size every few months. This growth has
created new markets and has forced some companies substantially to change their business strategies.
The fact that we cannot, in the nature of things, predict the changes that will radically transform the
industry's landscape should not lead us to doubt that changes will come about; only ignorance of
history, and poverty of imagination, would lead us to that conclusion. Nor should we be led to believe,
when established firms do maintain their place, that the powerful influence of innovation has not been
at work. Competition of the kind we are considering works as a discipline, and the threat of
dislodgement being ever present. Those who doubt this phenomenon should take account of the fast
development of the Internet which in the space of a few year has evolved from an obscure network
serving a limited number of academic sites in a few countries into a global network connecting
millions of individual computers.  The Internet as also begun to serve as a cheap, fast and10
international alternative to the physical distribution of software products through traditional retail
outlets. Not only do these developments mark a dramatic paradigm shift for the existing software
market, they have created a market for a range of entirely new software products, such as “Web
browsers” for the Internet. Such an environment affords companies that are new or marginally
important in today's software market the opportunity to capture a significant share of tomorrow's
software business. Start-up companies such as Netscape, which has been remarkably successful with
its Web browser, are thus on a strong footing in competing with more established companies. This
constant transformation of the software industry's technological foundations provides a relentless
challenge to the competitive position of every market participant. 
Systems and Networks
I have so far analysed the working of the software market without attending to one of its most
important features. A software product is of no use in itself, but only when working in conjunction
with other complementary products as part of a system. Thus in the simplest case of an isolated
11
A compendious survey of the law on computer software is provided by Kutten, L. J., Computer Software,11
Callaghan, Illinois, Clark Boardman (1995) and also in Scott, M. D., Scott on Computer Law (2nd edition),
New Jersey, Prentice Hall Law and Business (1992).
This point, crucial in this context, is developed more fully in an article which I wrote to identify the12
circumstances in which the coordination of economic activity can take place simply through market transactions
between firms, as distinct from the circumstances in which it requires cooperative arrangements between firms
and the circumstances in which it is best brought about by direction within a firm. Richardson, G. B., “The
Organisation of Industry”, Economic Journal, pp. 883:96 (Sept. 1992).
personal computer, software products must work with each other; an operating system, specifically,
must work with applications, as well as with a microprocessor and other elements in a hardware
platform. In the case of an extended network such as the so-called information highway, the set of
related components will be much larger.  If these systems, large or small, are to do what we expect11
of them, then the component parts must be so designed as to inter-operate. 
In what ways can this be achieved? One model would be for a whole set of related components to be
made by a single firm able itself to assume responsibility for so designing them as to ensure the needed
compatibility. This way of achieving a set of inter-operating components may be termed planned
integration. But although some such integration does take place in the sphere of activity we are
considering, it is manifestly not how the necessary coordination is in reality generally brought about.
It is instructive, nevertheless, to ask ourselves why this is so, for, by identifying the disadvantages of
planned integration, we shall be better able to understand the inherent economic logic of the
alternative ways in which the market can bring into being the sets of inter-operating products which
information technology has made available for our use.
Two circumstances set limits to what can be achieved by planned integration within one firm. The first
arises from the fact that the different component elements in a set, such as, for example,
microprocessors, monitors, disks and software, require, although they have to inter-operate, very
different skills, experience, and equipment in their production.  They require, that is to say, a variety12
of capabilities not all of which are likely to be possessed by one firm. The second obstacle to planned
integration is simply the economies of scale that feature in the production of some of the component
parts of the set. A firm able to meet the development costs of, say, all the hardware components and
associated software of a computer, would have to be very large indeed; there would be room, in any
economy, for very few of them, and the barrier to entry would be exceedingly high. Consumers would
be limited in their choice between the complete systems of different manufacturers and not be free to
select between hardware and software components as they can in fact now. 
The personal computer industry did not develop through the integration, by single manufacturers, of
12
On integration see also e.g. Porter, M. E., Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Industries and Competitors,13
London, New York, MacMillan Publ. (1980).
See Porter, M. E., op. cit.14
the related elements in a system.  A very large number of firms are engaged in making hardware and13
software components; there is some vertical integration, both IBM and Apple making both hardware
and software, but within the computer industry there is a vast number of firms, of very differing size,
linked in complex and changing patterns of competition and cooperation.  No doubt this diffuse14
structure owes something to historical accident, but the obstacles to extended integration noted above
would, I believe, have led in any event to an industrial structure of the kind we now have.
That this structure has been favourable to the development and exploitation of information technology
could scarcely be denied; certainly an historical parallel to the astonishing rate of growth of the
personal computer industry would be hard to find. Economic analysis is not so reliably advanced that
we can very confidently prescribe optimal industrial structures, and the more modest of its
practitioners will be willing to accept the success of the prevailing, but unplanned, structure as
creating a presumption in its favour.
How then, with many independent firms competing and cooperating in the market place, can the
compatibility, or inter-operability, of their complementary products obtained? One obvious way is
through the establishment of formal standards, agreement upon which may be sought through
negotiation between the parties. The process is carried forward typically by small technical working
groups seeking consensus, and, although governmental and inter-governmental agencies may be
involved, private firms commonly provide the necessary personnel and finance. 
Firms are prepared to work together in establishing compatibility standards when they perceive it to
be in their interest to do so. And, where the demand for their products depends on inter-operability,
a motive exists to achieve standardisation though agreement. But it is important to recognise that
sometimes it is neither practicable, nor socially desirable for compatibility to be obtained by this route.
There are two circumstances which, in this context, must be given weight. 
First, there is the possibility of genuine uncertainty as to the best specifications to establish in order
to define, and, when need be, re-define, a compatibility standard; this consideration is important in any
industry subject to rapid technical change. In these circumstances, it may be better to put up with
limited compatibility rather than fix standards before it has become clear how and when to do so.
Secondly, there are situations, of great importance in the industry which concerns us, where
13
compatibility cannot be secured merely by choosing specifications, however careful and thorough the
process may be, but has to be created at the cost of substantial investment and the application of
technical and marketing skills. Compatibility is achieved this way through the mediation of a de facto
standard, which in this context is the name given to a product which inter-operates very widely with
others. It is to the adoption of these standards that we must now turn.
The creation of de facto standards
It is tempting to say that de facto standards, such as Novell's Netware or Microsoft's Windows, simply
“emerge” in the market. But this is to make appear as automatic a development that is sought after
through the application, over a period, of substantial resources. It is true that the market is the final
arbiter, but the selection it comes to make is between alternatives, in the development, testing and
marketing of which their firms have invested heavily. Windows is, in this respect, a good example. It
is the product of extended technical development, but also of consultation with the makers of
hardware and of applications software, and of elaborate, time - consuming and expensive programmes
of testing, both by Microsoft and a host of independent individuals and concerns. The process of so-
called “evangelization”, by which firms are persuaded to develop applications that will fit an operating
system, is a crucial part of seeking to obtain the volume of derived demand that will tip the market
in its fvour and make it a de facto standard. If all goes well, these efforts will lead to an effect of the
snowballing kind I referred to earlier; hardware manufacturers will load the operating system because
of the demand for applications that work with it and, as the installed base grows, so will the volume
of related applications and the consequential derived demand for the operating system. If, however,
momentum does not build up in this way, a great deal of money can be lost. The market provides the
emerging standard with a pragmatic sanction; for those firms seeking to provide it, the risks are high
and the prizes and penalties correspond. 
In the working of industry as I have described it, there is every reason to expect operating systems
that are de facto standards to be open, in the sense that the firm that created them will give freely the
information about them that is needed by applications developers in order to make their products
compatible. There is also every reason to expect that their use should be charged for. Without the
prospect of an income from their licensing, the investment in their development, in the crucial process
of evangelisation, and in subsequent user support programs, would not have been undertaken. Any
argument that these systems should be costless cannot be sustained. The case for charging is the same
as that made, in respect of all software designed to meet a market need, at the beginning of this paper.
Conclusions
14
The Business Software Alliance (BSA) and the Software Publishers Association (SPA) state that the software15
industry loses approximately 50% of its potential profit to pirates. Cited in Dvorak, J., Dvorak Predicts: an
Insider’s Look at the Computer Industry, Berkeley, California, McGraw Hill, p. 4 (1994). See also Davidson,
If the analysis which is have presented is correct, the software industry is very competitive, and this
despite the fact that particular products may enjoy large market shares. The most powerful force at
work to preserve competition is the high rate of innovation prevailing; this ensures that no firm is
invulnerable, but has to fight to maintain its position. Market shares are made potentially more
insecure by the fact that the extent to which a product can be licensed is not limited by considerations
of productive capacity. The public interest, it seems to me, is promoted by the resultant balance
between competition, on the one hand, and, on the other, the exploitation of unlimited scale
economies. The working of the market in this context does also produce de facto standards and,
thereby, a substantial degree of inter-operability. 
Questions arise as to the role, in this context, of legislation protecting intellectual property, as to
whether competition could be made yet more effective by government action, and as to whether
standards should be set in a manner different from that I have described. These are the matters to
which I now turn. 
Part II Public Policy
Introductory
In the first part of this paper, I sought to provide an economic analysis of the market for computer
software; my aim in this part is to consider some public policy issues that arise in this context. I shall
be concerned with the protection of intellectual property, with competition policy and with the
establishment of industry standards, my hope being to help identify what should be on governmental
agenda and what not. 
The Rationale of Intellectual Property Protection
Software developers are paid for authorising the use of their products, and were this use not to require
authorisation, unauthorised use being prohibited by law, they would have nothing to sell. The case for
copyright protection, as normally put, is that it is necessary to provide an innovator with the incentive
to undertake the investment, and bear the risks, of developing and marketing his product.  Without15
15
D. M. and Davidson, J. A., Advanced Legal Systems for Buying and Selling Computers and Software.
The basis of this propostion is to be found in the literature on efficient ressource allocation; see Richardson, G.16
B., Economic Theory, London, Hutchinson and Co., (1964) ch. 2.
a “closed period”, sufficient to enable the innovator, as the sole legally permitted seller of his product,
to recover its cost and make a profit, the essential motivation would be lacking. But this way of
putting the matter, although valid, fails to make clear that intellectual property protection is necessary
irrespective of whether personal gain is the incentive to invest. It may give the impression that such
protection would not be necessary if the investment were undertaken in a collectivist regime or by
public authorities within a mixed economy.
Such a conclusion would be false. In any economic system with claims to rationality, a way must be
found of assessing whether an investment is justified, whether the resultant benefits to society are
greater than their opportunity costs; whether they are greater, that is to say, than the benefits that
might have been obtained had the resources been put to another purpose. Where fundamental research
is concerned, and the potential benefits uncertain, diffuse and deferred, assessment is very difficult,
and the investment is, in the main, paid for by public bodies without a close calculation of return. The
new knowledge produced may then be made available as a free good. That fundamental research is
of great importance, not least in computer science, goes without saying, but there will be, in any kind
of economy, a great deal of investment in the development of new products for which there is believed
to be a specific need. And where investment of this kind is concerned, we have to find a way of
making rational choices, of deciding whether and in what quantity resources should be applied to the
development of this or that particular product for which there is believed to be a potential consumer
demand. 
The method of assessment generally used is, of course, that of comparing the monetary cost of the
resources applied with what consumers would pay for the resultant product.  If the latter exceeds the16
former, then there a presumption that the investment was socially worth while. This test, although
subject to qualification, is an essential starting point, but without intellectual property protection, it
could not be applied. Unlicensed copying would prevent the relevant market prices from being
established. 
One might imagine that, in the absence of such protection, a public authority might somehow estimate
how much they think that consumers would be prepared to pay for a software product which will in
fact be made available to them free, and invest on the basis of that estimate. Such a procedure would
however be, at best, exceedingly hazardous, for if the product were not in fact to be sold, there could
be no way of finding out whether the estimates made were right or wrong. To further allocative
16
This will, of course, not be a matter of pure chance. Any firm seeking to create a market for a new product has17
a very strong commercial incentive to offer such compatibility. Where compatibility fails to exist, moreover,
the opportunity is created for specialist firms to develop, where feasible, software products which bridge the
gap.
efficiency, a system of prices has to be introduced, and a requirement for this, where we are concerned
with technology that can be easily appropriated, is having patent and copyright protection in place.
A viable software industry, we must therefore firmly conclude, is quite crucially dependent on the
effective copyright or patent protection. Only the very unreflecting would take the view that the
creation of these legal rights, by the state, somehow dilutes competition within an industry; the reality
is that these rights are a necessary condition for the very existence of a competitive industry in which
resources are applied to create knowledge or information, from the licensed use of which it is hoped
that revenue can be obtained. 
Competition and Barriers to Entry
I sought to show, in the first part of this paper, that the computer software industry is highly
competitive, despite the fact that one manufacturer's product may, for a time, enjoy the lion's share
of its market. The rate of innovation was high enough to ensure, I maintained, that such a product
would be continuously vulnerable to displacement. It has however been argued that, even if the
possession of a large market share does not in itself afford the advantages of a monopoly, its existence
within a set of complementary products necessarily does. This is the contention that I shall now
consider.
Put simply, the argument runs as follows; even if a system superior to say, Windows, or Novell's
NetWare, were to become available, consumers would be unwilling to switch to it, because of all the
application software on the market designed to be compatible with the established products. In order
to displace these products, a complete new set of complementary products would have to become
available and offer such advantages as would justify the cost of switching to them. This inter-locking,
it is suggested, constitutes a strong barrier to entry and provides the owners of the established systems
with monopoly power.
There are a number of weaknesses in this argument. First, there is the simple point that a new product,
say, an operating system, may be compatible with those applications designed for the established
one.  Moreover, a new operating system would not have to be able to run every existing application17
in order to compete with an established one; provided its inherent merits were strong enough, the
17
Porter, M. E., Competitive Strategy, Techniques for Industries and Competitors, London, New York, MacMillan18
Publ. (1980).
ability to run a sufficient number of important existing applications could carry the day.
If the new system were compatible with no existing application, then its acceptance would certainly
be more difficult, but it would not be impossible. The firm introducing it would be obliged, as was the
owner of the prevailing standard at an earlier stage, to induce independent software developers to
write suitable applications or otherwise to do so itself. And where the life cycle of a product is as short
as in this industry, entry on this basis is feasible.  So long as we analyse the possibilities of entry in18
terms of a static situation, the difficulties appear greater than in reality they are. The rate of innovation
is such that the landscape is ever changing, with new opportunities continuously opening up. If
established firms maintain their position, then they will have adapted their own products appropriately.
No one can stand still.
As in every industry, being already established, or being first in the field, does offer advantages
peculiar to that situation. If consumers are familiar with the product, if they are satisfied with it and
with the support they have received, and if they know that it fits well with other products related to
it in use, then they will display towards its vendor some limited loyalty. But the existence of
reputations in the market place, and the position of a product within a network, provide no evidence
of monopoly; it is, indeed, in the striving to gain, or defend, or challenge such positions
18
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 of advantage that competition characteristically manifests itself.19
We also need to reflect on the circumstances that, from society's point of view, justify new entry, or
the displacement of one product by another. If a firm finds difficulty in selling, say, a new operating
system, for the reason that it is incompatible with established and important applications software,
then this is as it should be; there is a real cost to consumers and to society in having to replace existing
application programs, and if that cost does not appear to consumers as likely to be compensated by
the advantages of the new operating system, then this circumstance is in no way an unfair barrier to
entry, but something that should properly enter into the calculations of a firm considering whether to
offer the new system on the market. 
For the reasons I have given, I do not think that a software program, which is a de facto standard
linked to a network of complementary products, is thereby likely to have an unassailable market
position. It may be maintained, however, that there at least exists the possibility that a software
product, if it has become a standard, may become so strongly entrenched that undue profit is earned
from licensing it. Competitors seeking to displace the standard have of course a motive for saying so,
but, setting this aside, let us consider what the public policy response should be were the situation
hypothesised be judged to exist. 
It will not do to argue that such standards should be brought “into the public domain”; unless the
public, through some official agency with appropriate capabilities, is prepared to meet the cost of
maintaining and developing these standards, they will have to be privately owned. It would, of course,
be possible to restrict the profits being earned on the product, either by curtailing the life of the
associated intellectual property protection, or by controlling licensing charges. But whether such an
approach would, on balance, further the public interest, is another matter. In an industry so fluid,
where risks are great, where prospects of spectacular success are balanced by prospects of sudden
massive failure, the notion of “undue profits” is difficult to define and to apply. The analogy with
public utility regulation is scarcely close, as the industries concerned, compared with 
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 the software industry, are strikingly sedate.20
The threat of leverage
Yet another detriment, or at any rate danger, is sometimes identified as a possible indirect
consequence of the possession by an operating system, or other key program, of a large share of a
particular market. A firm, it is pointed out, may be able to exploit a monopoly in one market in order
to obtain a monopoly in another, a practice referred to sometimes as leverage. In the computer
software industry, it has been suggested, a firm might use a monopoly in an operating system in order
to oblige customers to license its own applications programs, which were compatible with that system,
rather than those of competitors, which were not. No firm does in fact have a full monopoly in the
market for operating systems, in the sense that computer users are obliged to buy its product. It may
however be maintained that the possession of a large share of the market may be enough to permit
a degree of leverage to be exerted. A firm might be able, it has been suggested, so to develop an
operating system that certain applcations software programs, in competition with its own, will not
work with this system. A weaker form of the accusation is that such a firm could seek, not wholly to
disable applications software competing with its own, but merely to put such applications at a
disadvantage by giving their potential developers less timely information about the interfaces with
which they must be compatible. 
Whether any particular firm does or does not behave in this way is first of all a matter of fact, and it
is fair to start by noting that, although this behaviour has been alleged, regulatory investigation does
not so far appear to have provided confirmation.  General reasoning, moreover, leads us not to be21
surprised at this outcome. We took note earlier of the importance, in establishing a de facto standard,
of the process of “evangelization”, and it is hard to believe that a firm, having invested heavily in
inducing and assisting independent software vendors to develop applications for its operating system,
would then seek to disable or disadvantage these applications. Of course it would be possible for the
firm so to behave, but the breach of faith implicit in such behaviour could scarcely assist any future
evangelising efforts. To the extent, moreover, that a firm were to limit the variety of competing
20
For a presentation of the argument that there should be no intellectual properety protection for standard22
interfaces in the information society, see “Barrier Free Interfaces and the European Information Infrastructure”,
submitted to the European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS) to the European Parliament hearing
on the Global Information Society (Feb. 1995).
applications with which its operating system would be compatible, the greater would be the
vulnerability of that system to displacement by an alternative product.
Although it might be unwise for a firm to seek the kind of leverage in question, this does not prove
that it would not do so. As economic analysis, in the nature of things, cannot rule out the possibility
of such conduct, one cannot rule out the possible need for regulatory supervision. It seems to me
wrong, however, to urge that the development of operating systems and application software should
be disjoined, in order to exclude any possibility of abuse in question. The public interest could only
suffer if a firm, having acquired a capability in the development and marketing of one kind of software,
were prohibited from making the most of it through extending its range into another, particularly as
the risks of displacement to which any particular product is exposed provides a cogent reason for
some diversification. Forcibly to separate the development of the two related products would be to
deny the public a benefit in order to claim to prevent an abuse for the existence of which there is no
presumption and against which, in any case, there would be better remedies. It would be damaging,
moreover, and rather absurd, to insist that, say, an operating system had to be compatible with a wide
variety of applications, even where this necessarily involved depriving it of important advantages.
Although it would be wrong to say that abuses in this area could never exist, I am inclined to think
that the general interest will at present best be served, in the great majority of circumstances, by
allowing the firm supplying a software product to determine the features affecting its compatibility
on the basis of its own commercial interests. 
Specifications and Standards
The emergence within the industry of software programs that have become de facto standards, which
are proprietary, and for the licensed use of which users have to pay, is sometimes said to be against
the public interest. Such key interfaces within the system, the argument runs, should be available to
all without charge. Let specifications that ensure compatibility be laid down, it has been suggested,
each developer of the interface software being then free to devise his own implementation of them.
In this way, the argument continues, we can get the best of all worlds, achieving universal
compatibility while maintaining competition between the different implementations.  22
Within the context that concerns us here, this hope is illusory. An operating system, or its associated
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Which is not to say that predictions will not be made, e.g. those found in Dvorak, op. cit.24
applications programs, is not to be compared with, let us say, the electrical plugs and sockets, for
which compatibility can be secured by simple specifications. An elaborate process of consultation and
development is needed to obtain widespread compatibility, and we know that, as new and improved
versions of the standard are developed, the process has to be continuous. Who then would undertake
and pay for the work of devising specifications, adherence to which is presumed to ensure
compatibility and to which, say, all operating systems would have to conform? Who would undertake
and pay for the periodic changes in the specifications that underlying technical changes, say in the
microprocessor, would make necessary? How, and on whose authority, could the specifications be
imposed? And if somehow adherence to the specifications could initially be obtained, what is to
prevent developments in the various imlementations that would, in effect, start a drift from the
standard? A developer might bring in a new product which met the specifications, and was therefore
( let us assume ) compatible with existing applications, but which offered functionality which made
feasible new applications that would work with this particular implementation but none of the others.
Is such a developer to be prevented from making this innovation? For what reason, and on what
authority? These considerations lead one to believe that, while scope for agreed standardisation will
certainly exist, some key interfaces will have to continue to be owned, and their use to be paid for.
Private Enterprise, the Information Highway and the Future
The progress made in software development owes much to fundamental work done by government
agencies and in the universities. But it has also been furthered by the undertaking, by many firms large
and small, of many speculative and risky investments, and, in consequence, by the spectacular success
of some firms and the demise of many.  A variety of approaches have been followed, and competition23
has selected between them. In the nature of things, it would be difficult to mount, within the public
sector of an economy, such a plurality of differing approaches, such a massive experimentation. If a
government investment fails, the general public, or the party in opposition, is likely to attach blame
and call for explanation; because of this, risky investments may be avoided, there being a natural
reluctance simultaneously to adopt differing approaches, not all of which can prove successful. There
is a good deal of evidence that the course of the development of the software and related industries
has rarely been predicted correctly in the past, either by governments or by firms, and there is no
reason to believe that future development will be any more predictable.  In these circumstances, there24
much to be said for an economic system that permits a good deal of trial and error, leaving it to the
market to select the products, firms, and strategies that are successful. 
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There is a further circumstance which favours private enterprise in this sphere of economic activity.
The industry is characterised by much structural mutation; firms both compete and collaborate, they
enter into changing alliances, sometimes across traditional industrial boundaries, they take other firms
over, they lose staff who set up new firms, they flourish, and they fail. Such continuous re-structuring
is the response called for by the pace of technical change and the need to relate activities which are
complementary, with respect, say, to the development of an information highway, but which have been
undertaken within previously distinct industries, such as communications, computers, publishing and
television. And such permanent metamorphosis, particularly on an international scale, is a condition
state enterprises are very much less likely to be able to manage.
As regards the future of the so-called information highway, it seems to me that, although we have a
reasonably good general idea of the potentialities of inter-active systems of communication, no one
can say with confidence exactly how they will be realised. Given this uncertainty, there is a strong case
for a regime of commercial freedom. It is argued in a CEC White Paper (COM (93) 700 final,
Brussels, 5 December 1993, p.66)  that we need “the establishment of a coherent and concerted25
approach to strategic alliances, the uncontrolled development of which could result in the creation of
oligopolistic situations prejudicial to competition at world levels.”  It is recommended that the effect26
of the alliances be assessed “simultaneously and in a concerted manner by the competent
authorities.”  One is bound to wonder, and worry, about what the authors had in mind. World wide27
alliances already exist, and will certainly further develop; they are essential to realise the potential of
the information super-highway, which will require firms from different industries and in different
countries to become engaged. There will also be competition between these alliances, and this
competition (although no doubt intense) will be oligopolistic, for the reason that scale economies rule
out the possibility of there being room for a large number of such groupings in the market place. In
what way, and for what reason, are the so-called “competent authorities” to assess the alliances? 
Perhaps the purpose of the assessment would be to decide which of the alliances were to receive
public support and which were not. Or perhaps the authorities would endeavour to bring into
existence groupings different from those that would have formed otherwise. It is in either case hard
to envisage these aims being realised in any informed and rational manner; civil servants depend for
information and opinion about the costs, technology and future prospects of particular industries very
much upon what they are told by the firms within them, by people, that is with interests at stake. It
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is not possible to make strategic judgements, however, by reasoning from first principles, but only on
the basis of limited and unreliable information and opinion of this kind. Even if it were possible in
principle, therefore, for public authorities to determine an optimal pattern of alliances, and an optimal
strategy for future developments in this area, they are unlikely in practice to be able to identify it. The
realit is that no one knows for sure how the potentialities of inter-active communication will precisely
be realised, and society in these circumstances is likely to be best served by there being some variety
of approach, the resources being committed by firms that stand to lose or gain from the outcome. 
I do not maintain that there is no role for government, or inter-governmental, action in this sphere.
The very existence of the industry depends on a legal construction, copyright, which only governments
can design and regulate. Nor do I wish to suggest that there will be no scope at any time or in any
circumstances for governmental initiatives in setting standards. I believe, however, that governments
should, in this matter, be pragmatic. Intervention can do more harm than good unless informed by an
understanding of how free competitive enterprise operates in the software industry and an appreciation
of the its essential appropriateness to the circumstances prevailing.
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